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assistance.1 Introduction
“Excessive” borrowing, housing demand and risk taking are frequently mentioned by
commentators attempting to explain recent crises in US ﬁnancial and housing mar-
kets. The notion of excessive consumption (especially of so-called “toxic” loans and
ﬁnancial products) is the maintained premise that motivates various arguments, put
forward from distinct political viewpoints, for regulatory reforms, new programs, and
products aimed at improving consumers’ self control.1 Diﬀerent interpretations of
recent events (in ﬁnancial, housing—and now labor—markets) put varying degrees
of emphasis on the role that ﬂawed consumer decision making has played, alterna-
tively focusing on consumers’ excessive borrowing (Holzer, 2009), regulatory failure
(Brown, 2007; Bernanke, 2010), insuﬃcient ﬁscal stimulus (Krugman, 2009; 2010),
and other institutional failures that may have encouraged accounting fraud (Black,
2005; Akerlof and Romer, 1993) as root causes. Rather than address controversies
surrounding these interpretations, this paper takes for granted that consumers are ca-
pable of excess, assuming that they reﬂect on this very possibility, and then attempt
to change preferences in a purposeful and eﬀortful manner using technology that aids
self control.
This paper introduces a simple model of self control that, unlike most of the self
control literature in economics, does not rely on time inconsistency or the multiple-
selves framework. The model introduced here is used to analyze how consumers
1Excessive consumption, or “over-consumption,” and its welfare consequences is discussed in reports by the Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002), Bae and Ott (2008), and numerous others in
behavioral economics. See, however, Sugden (2004), Starr (2007), and Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) for diﬀerent views
on the normative authority of standard neoclassical rationality axioms and the methodological implications of mod-
elers who interpret agents in their models as engaging in excessive consumption. The model presented here describes
an agent who, after thinking through diﬀerent ways of achieving contentment under diﬀerent future contingencies,
regards some levels of acquisitiveness as excessive and uses preference change technology to moderate his or her desire
for ordinary consumption.
1might respond to new regulatory institutions, educational campaigns, and ﬁnancial
services that aim to help consumers improve self control and moderate potentially
excessive demand for certain goods and services.2 The model draws motivation from
the observation that, after introspecting on one’s goals and various means of reaching
them, consumers routinely wish to modify those goals in a way that makes them more
achievable (i.e., less prone to the discontentment of not having reached the minimum
level of ordinary consumption used by the consumer to benchmark his or her goals).
This motive leads consumers to substitute out of ordinary consumption and into a dis-
tinct class of expenditures on preference-change technology (i.e., self control), which
reduces desire for ordinary consumption. Acquisitionof costly preference-change tech-
nology is referred to as demand for self control, in distinction with expenditures on
everything other than self control, which is referred to as ordinary consumption (i.e.,
2The model abstracts from institutional detail specifying particular forms of self control technologies. Aggre-
gated as a single category of resource expenditure, the consumer’s allocation of resources into self control can be
interpreted ﬂexibly, for example, as taking up ﬁnancial literacy programs, credit counseling, or choosing privately
marketed products that oﬀer intentionally restricted choice sets that serve as commitment devices. Such behavior
ﬁnds motivation in the ﬁnding of widespread ﬁnancial illiteracy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Huston, 2010), and
expanding such programs is explicitly recommended by Yao, Hanna and Lindamood (2004), Emmons (2005) and
many others. Products and programs that make self control technology more available are generally interpretable in
our model as a reduction in the price of self control. Examples include the Save More Tomorrow program (Thaler
and Benartzi, 2004); greater availability of information making it easier for consumers to be savvy price shoppers
on the lookout for favorable borrowing terms (Kerr and Dunn, 2008); consumers’ use of debit cards as a device to
impose spending limits on themselves (Stavins, 2008); tax withholding as a savings commitment device (Barr and
Dokko, 2008); borrowing limits on credit cards (Dey and Mumy, 2005); social security as a forced savings device that
aids self control (Kumru and Thanopoulos, 2008); and smaller package sizes that might, for example, help smokers
encourage themselves to keep open the option of quitting by buying packs instead of cartons (Wertenbroch, 1998),
although small package sizes sometimes appear to have perverse eﬀects that increase consumption (do Valle, Pieters,
and Zeelenberg, 2008). Even credit cards can, in some contexts, be considered as a self control technology, providing a
means to counter the temptation to sell illiquid retirement assets in tax deferred savings accounts which would incur
large penalties (Bertaut, Haliassos and Reiter, 2009). Important diﬀerences in ﬁnancial literacy and other consumer
behaviors have been documented in low-income populations (Servon and Kaestner, 2008; Beverly and Sherraden,
1999), which translates in our model to distinct wealth endowment and consumption-aspiration parameters.
2goods and services that monotonically increase utility, holding preferences ﬁxed).
The exogenous preference model of neoclassical economics taught in most microe-
conomics textbooks focuses on maximization of satisfaction (i.e., a utility function
that depends on ordinary consumption) while holding preferences and the exoge-
nously given resource constraint ﬁxed. An alternative goal-seeking model that ﬁts
squarely within the constrained optimization methodology of neoclassical economics
(yet, puzzlingly, is rarely, if ever, addressed in this literature) can be described as fol-
lows. Given the ﬂows of ordinary consumption that one currently owns, maximize the
experienced satisfaction derived from it, by engaging in purposeful preference change
with the aid of preference-change technology.3 The consumer asks him or herself: Is
it better to increase expected ordinary consumption conditional on what one wants,
or control what one wants conditional on what one has?4
Following standard competitive price theory, the model in this paper assumes the
consumer takes the price of preference-change technology as given(relativeto ordinary
consumption). With standard assumptions, the model produces an optimal choice
rule for a consumer who simultaneously considers beneﬁts and costs of allocating
3Goal seeking is modeled and investigated empirically by G¨ uth (2010), Bergninghaus, G¨ uth, Levati and Qui
(forthcoming),and G¨ uth , Levati and Ploner(2009; 2010). Fisher and Montalto (2010)use a reference-point-dependent
model similar in spirit to ours, combined with empirical analysis of a large survey data set, to argue for the empirical
relevance of reference points, goal setting, and the importance for policy makers to consider multiple consumer goals.
Jain (2009) presents a related model of goal seeking but without the contentment threshold built into the utility
function in our model. Consistent with this paper, Samwick (2006) documents heterogeneous goals among savers;
Zhang, Huang and Broniarczyk(2010) show additionaldimensions of the importance of consumer goals; and a number
of experimental studies lend support to goal setting as a primary behavioral mechanism resulting in contentment and
discontentment (Lee and Ariely, 2006; Trudel and Cotte, 2008; Drolet, Luce and Simonson, 2009).
4Starkly diﬀerent views about how humans achieve happiness can be found in various philosophical traditions,
discussed in detail in Bruni and Porta (2007), who emphasize social ties as sources of satisfaction and the need to
learn special techniques for moderating one’s desires. Although the topics of self control and moderation of desire are
sometimes described in esoteric terms, this paper focuses on self control in the context of the ongoing ﬁnancial market
crisis and numerous proposals being debated to help consumers manage their borrowing, consumption of housing, and
use of ﬁnancial services.
3one’s resources (eﬀort or wealth endowment) to the expected quantity of ordinary
consumption versus preference-change technology that increases the likelihood that
one is satisﬁed with the quantity of ordinary consumption he or she will receive ex
post.5 With regard to the role of consumer behavior and consumer ﬁnance products
in recent housing and ﬁnancial crises, ordinary consumption should be interpreted as
a composite of housing, credit, and ﬁnancial products whose status as “goods” has
come under question (e.g., payday lending services).
Policies, programs and products aimed at cultivating self control are interpreted
in this model as interventions that lower the price of self control. The model then
provides an answer to the question of how consumers will respond to new incentives
to take up self control. The model is simple. Self control directly raises utility by
transforming preferences such that every ﬁxed level of ordinary consumption yields
greater experienced satisfaction because, ex ante, it carries a reduced risk of falling
short of one’s goal. This mechanism provides a simple motive for self control and
facilitates applied analysis relevant to consumer ﬁnance and the uptake of services for
cultivating self control, without relying on time inconsistency or the multiple-selves
framework (studied with great insight, and both theoretical and empirical rigor, by
Tirole, 2002; Giﬀord (2002); Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister, 2003; B´ enabou
and Tirole, forthcoming; and others who focus on time inconsistency as a means of
modeling problems in self control).
5Diﬀerent interpretations of the consumer’s resource allocation problem enjoy empirical support, alternatively, in
units of eﬀort or money. For example, Oaten and Cheng (2007) show that simple practice (i.e., eﬀort) can have
large eﬀects on self control in the ﬁnancial decision making context. And if there were any doubt that demand for
self control responds systematically to its price in units of money, a rather impressive empirical record establishes
large demand-side eﬀects of price eﬀects on self control (Feldstein, 1995; Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy and Tyler, 2007;
Duygan-Bump and Grant, 2008), although it remains unclear whether the measured magnitudes can be extrapolated
to new contexts. Self control in the context of developing economies is studied by Semboja (2004) and Ashraf, Karlan
and Yin (2005).
4Even in the simplest version of our model, several surprising results emerge. First,
self control is an inferior good, with demand decreasing as a function of an exoge-
nously given wealth endowment. Second, because of the joint interaction of ordinary
consumption and the contentment threshold (a choice variable under the decision
maker’s control), demand for self control exhibits unusually strong income eﬀects, re-
sulting in upward-sloping demand curves on a dense subset of the model’s parameter
space. Thus, the model provides a new explanation (other than the commitment de-
vice hypothesis found in multiple-selvesmodels) for consumers who prefer high-priced
self-control technologies. Finally, because demand for self control is non-monotonic
in price, and because the globally maximizing level of self control switches discontin-
uously from interior to corner solutions, the model’s price and demand dynamics are
highly unstable. Small changes in price (over large regions of the model’s parameter
space) produce dramatic shifts in demand for self control, perhaps equivalent to dif-
ferences in social norms about personal savings in the U.S. and Japan, or religious
revolutions that focus on moderation of desire for material or worldly consumption.
Therefore, attempts by policy makers, nonproﬁts, banks, and other ﬁnancial services
ﬁrms to reach consumers using standard economic incentives (i.e., reductions in the
price of self control) may have no eﬀect at all, moderate eﬀects, huge eﬀects, or (in the
case where the decision making environment is situated on an upward-sloping portion
of the demand schedule for self control) large eﬀects in the opposite direction as had
been anticipated. Unstable demand for self control (again, due to non-monotonicity
and occasional discontinuities)is, in essence, an anything goes result. Given a detailed
description of exogenous factors in the environment, the model does indeed provide
(mostly) unambiguous predictions about consumer responses to incentives aimed at
inducing greater self control. However, any imprecision in estimates describing the
decision making environment can lead to unanticipated demand responses.
5One novel element of the model is that self control is a technology that directly re-
duces reference-point levels of ordinary consumption needed to achieve psychological
contentment (e.g., everything from credit counseling and ﬁnancial literacy programs
to religious teaching or philosophical practice aimed at moderating demand for ordi-
nary consumption). This implies that preferences are, to a partial extent, a choice
variable (c.f., George, 2001).
In this sense, ours can be described as a contentment-aspiration theory of self
control, modeled after extensive theoretical work and empirical evidence in favor of
satisﬁcing (G¨ uth, 2010; G¨ uth, Levati and Ploner, 2009; 2010; Bergninghaus, G¨ uth,
Levati and Qui, forthcoming). Giﬀord (2002) presents an original dynamical model
where self control is modeled as inhibition of emotion, which is needed to undertake
deliberation about the decision making environment. Most theoretical models of self
control in behavioral economics identify self control problems with dynamic incon-
sistency (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Carrillo, 1998; Kim, 2005; Fudenberg and
Levine, 2006). The one-period model introduced in this paper complements this line
of work by showing a distinct motive for self control, interpreted as purposeful mod-
eration of one’s preferences through a mechanism of contentment aspiration or goal
seeking.
Research on self control in a consumer ﬁnance context includes credit cards (Cas-
tronova and Hagstrom, 2004; Kawaja, 1969), retirement saving (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981; Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 1998; Otto, Davies and Chater, 2007; Be-
nartzi and Thaler, 2007), other investment decisions (Hilton, 2001; Bergstresser and
Porterba, 2004; Lai, 2006; Chatterjee, Goetz and Palmer, 2009), personal bankruptcy
(White, 2009), smoking (Kan, 2007; Ernst, Hogan, Vallas, Cook and Fuller, 2009),
food choice (Smith, 2002; Lin and Yen, 2008 ), and other consumer decisions (Sally,
2000; Karlsson, 2003; Ramanathan and Williams, 2007; Vohs and Faber, 2007; Fryer,
62010; Laran, 2010; Hastings and Washington, 2010). Self control, restraint and mod-
eration technologies are studied in economic history as well (Gamber, 2003; Zhang,
Huang and Broniarczyk, 2010), which motivates some interpretations of our model
mentioned above.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes the decision problem and solves
for optimizing quantities of ordinary consumption and self control, which are ex-
pressed explicitly as functions of the price of self control, parameters specifying self
control technology, production technology, and the wealth or resource constraint. Sec-
tion 3 reports comparative statics showing that self control technology in the standard
consumer problem is an inferior good. Section 4 depicts demand curves for self control
as a function of price, revealing strong income eﬀects that produce upward sloping,
and sometimes discontinuous, self control. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of
how this extremely simple model illuminates the complexities of consumer ﬁnance
and institutional design.
2 The Model
Let X represent the uncertain quantity of ordinary consumption the decision maker
receives ex post, with cdf F(x), density f(x), and expected value E[X]=μ.T h e
function μ(a)=E [ X] describes how the choice variable a (for acquisitiveness), repre-
senting allocation of eﬀort into acquiringordinary consumption, aﬀects the consumer’s
expected payoﬀ in units of ordinary consumption. We assume μ(a) is increasing and
diﬀerentiable (i.e., μ (a) > 0).6
The other eﬀortful activity in the model aside from ordinary consumption that
6The following paragraph departs from standard consumer theory by modeling a consumer’s explicit reasoning
about allocating scarce resources to a preference-transforming activity which changes the expected utility associated
with any ﬁxed quantity of ordinary consumption.
7increases utility is denoted s (for self control). Eﬀort toward self control, s, aﬀects
utility by reducing the probability of falling short of one’s goal or target level of or-
dinary consumption, all else equal.7 All else is not equal, however, when the decision
maker adjusts s.R a i s i n gs (to a higher level of eﬀort toward self control) comes at
the real cost of reduced a and, consequently, a reduced level of expected ordinary
consumption, μ(a). At the cost of eﬀort that would otherwise go toward ordinary
consumption, the decision maker in our model can choose instead to spend some or
all of that eﬀort lowering the threshold that deﬁnes contentment and thereby ac-
tively transform his own preferences.8 The mechanism by which s moderates desire
is assumed to take the speciﬁc form of a controllable threshold-level of ordinary con-
sumption. Contentment and discontentment are psychological states deﬁned in terms
of this threshold parameter, based on Simon (1956), Gigerenzer and Selten (2002),
and G¨ uth’s (2010) notion of satisﬁcing.9
The threshold that deﬁnes contentment is denoted t = t(s,t0), which depends on
self control s and an exogenously given initial threshold t0.I f X<t (s,t0), then
7Preference-transformationtechnology, or “self control” for short, enables one to feel content with less. Discontent-
ment and contentment refer to a psychological component of the utility function deﬁned explicitly below. Allocation
of eﬀort for the purpose of moderating demand for ordinary consumption falls under the heading of self control, which
includes formal market transactionsfor books, services, and experiencesthat can be regardedas self controltechnology
and therefore not considered ordinary consumption. Ordinary consumption, then, is a residual consumption category,
including all goods and services not used for self control.
8Preference transformation technologies put forward in the self control literature include Wertenbroch (1998);
Thaler and Benartzi (2004); Dey and Mumy (2005); Kumru and Thanopoulos(2008); do Valle, Pieters, and Zeelenberg
(2008); Barr and Dokko (2008); Kerr and Dunn (2008); Stavins (2008); and Bertaut, Haliassos and Reiter (2009). An
alternative parameterization of self control will be introduced in a subsequent section. In the simpliﬁed linear version
of the general model developed there, it is most natural to apply the label “self control” not to s but to the resulting
distance by which preferences are transformed (in a sense that will be made concrete shortly).
9Jain (2009) studies goal attainment, with the interesting ﬁnding that it is sometimes better for consumers not
to have any goals. Our model is not a satisﬁcing model because it wholly adopts the assumption of expected utility
maximization and its implication of exhaustive search through the choice set rather than limited search as in the
satisﬁcing model, although the threshold mechanism that deﬁnes discontentment functionally resembles satisﬁcing.
8the event of discontentment occurs and the psychic cost of discontentment reduces
utility. When X ≥ t(s,t0), the discontentment term is zero. For low values of t,
discontentment can be interpreted as personal bankruptcy. Very large values of t
indicate intense desire for ordinary consumption in the form of a large requirement
to avoid the psychic cost of having not achieved one’s goal.10
Because s reduces the threshold separating the range of ordinary consumption





Eﬀort allocated to self control reduces the level of ordinary consumption needed to
avoid the psychological state of discontentedness. It is similarly natural to normalize
units of self control such that t(0,t 0)=t0, implying that the default threshold t0 is
the relevant reference-point level of consumption whenever zero eﬀort is allocated to
self control.
The magnitude by which ordinary consumption falls short of the threshold t is
max{t − X,0} and utility is then speciﬁed as the function u(X,max{t − X,0}),
which is increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second. The key
trade-oﬀ in the model concerns the reduction in eﬀort applied to acquisitiveness (a)
and consequently lower expected ordinary consumption X that results, whenever an
additional unit of eﬀort is applied toward s to lower contentment threshold t.
10DeJong and Ripoll’s (2006) alternative approach to specifying the utility function to model self control adds a
temptation cost to the objective function that is proportional at each period to the utility that would have been
derived from spending one’s entire lifetime wealth on present consumption.
92.1 From Units of Eﬀort to Units of Ordinary Consumption
In this section, we translate the consumer’s eﬀort variables a and s to units of ordinary
consumption, which allow us to quantify the opportunity cost of self control in units
of expected ordinary consumption. First, we identify self control with the distance by
which the contentment threshold is reduced from t0. This introduces an alternative
deﬁnition of self control in units of ordinary consumption:
δ = δ(s) ≡ t0 − t. (2)
According to this deﬁnition, the non-negative δ measures the decrease from t0 that
produces the moderated, or self controlled, threshold t = t0 − δ. The idea that eﬀort





The normalization t(0,t 0)=t0 is equivalent to
δ(0) = 0. (4)
The goal of this section is to compute
∂μ(a)
∂δ along the resource constraint so that
its magnitude can be parameterized as the price of self control (i.e., the ordinary
consumption foregone for one unit of self control). We take this in three steps.
First, to measure the additional s requiredto increaseδ by one unit (i.e., reduce t by
one unit) given by preference-change technology δ(s), we need the inverse relationship





The aggregate eﬀort/resource constraint plays an important role in the model,
given by the eﬀort aggregation function e(a,s) ,w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob es m o o t h ,
diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in both arguments, and the parameter A rep-
resenting the consumer’s endowment of aggregate eﬀort/resource (given exogenously
10by biological, social, institutional, or historical factors) as:
e(a,s) ≤ A. (5)
Along the manifold where this constraint binds, there is an implicit tradeoﬀ between
self control and expected ordinary consumption. The second step en route to com-
puting the price of self control is to express the cost of one unit of s in terms of a,
which can be computed (along the manifold deﬁned by the set on which the eﬀort










Finally, the third step requires a calculation of the opportunity cost (given by the
production technology μ(a)) of δ in terms of μ. The sensitivity of μ to a,
∂μ(a)
∂a ,c a n
also be represented as the ratio of diﬀerentials
Δμ
Δa.
Combining the three terms introduced above produces an expression for the price




















2.2 The Decision Problem
The decision maker’s ex ante problem can now be speciﬁed in detail. The decision
maker chooses a and s to maximize expected utility subject to three constraints
consisting of production technology, self-control technology, and the eﬀort resource
constraint:
max(a,s)∈ 2
+E[U(X,max{t0−δ(s)−X,0})], such that E[X]=μ(a),δ= δ(s), and e(a,s) ≤ A.
(8)
As long as the production and self-control technologies are deﬁned by one-to-one (i.e.,
invertible) functions so that a(μ)=μ−1 and s(δ)=δ−1 exist, the choice variables
11can be re-speciﬁed in terms of μ and δ by inserting these inverse relationships into
the resource constraint:
max(μ,δ)∈ 2
+E[U(X,max{t0 − δ − X,0})], such that e(a(μ),s(δ)) ≤ A. (9)
As the next section shows, with appropriate re-scaling, the eﬀort constraint in (9) can,
once again, be re-expressed as a budget constraint in units of ordinary consumption,
where the opportunity cost in equation (7) is re-parameterized as p, which represents
the price of δ in terms of μ.
2.3 Linear Version of the Model
Suppose the production in ordinary consumption is linear in a:




Suppose that the self-control technology is described by a linear relationship between
δ (the change in the contentment threshold) and s:




There is no constant in the linearization above because of the normalization in (4)
based on the requirement that, when zero eﬀort is applied to self control, the change in
the contentment threshold is also zero. The linear version of the model also supposes
that the eﬀort resource constraint is linear:














Thus, raising δ (i.e., reducing t) by one unit will cost va/vs in units of μ:
∂μ
∂δ = −va/vs.
We refer to the magnitude of this opportunity cost as the price of self control:
p = va/vs. (13)
122.4 The Eﬀort Constraint is a Budget Constraint
With linearized functional forms, the eﬀort constraint can be re-written in the easy-
to-recognize form of a budget constraint. Multiplying the equation a + s = A from
(12) through by va and adding μ0 to both sides obtains (after substituting μ = μ0+vaa
on the left-hand side):
μ + vas = vaA + μ0. (14)
The expression on the right-hand side represents the value of the aggregate eﬀort
endowment A in units of ordinary consumption, which is equal to the maximum
that μ can possibly take on (i.e., allocating all eﬀort to acquisitiveness), denoted
M ≡ vaA + μ0. Finally substituting pδ =( va/vs)(vss)=vas produces the budget
constraint:
μ + pδ = M. (15)
Equation (15) translates choice variables a and s in the eﬀort constraint e(a,s)=A
to a straightforward budget constraint in the transformed choice variables μ and δ,
where parameter p represents the price of self control.
2.5 Additively Separable Utility and Discontentment
Three further simpliﬁcations are introduced before solving the decision maker’s con-
strained optimization problem and analyzing the statics of demand for self control as a
function of exogenous variables given by the decision maker’s environment. The spec-
iﬁcation below assumes that U is additively separable in ordinary consumption and
discontentment. Second, the speciﬁcation assumes, apart from the discontentment
term, that preferences over distributions of X are risk neutral. Third, the speciﬁca-
tion ignores the magnitude by which ordinary consumption falls below the threshold t
and represents discontentment as a binary indicator variable. Binary discontentment
13could derive from a psychological process by which failing to meet one’s goal imposes
a ﬁxed psychic cost. A long-lasting malaise after failing to be admitted to any se-
lect colleges would be one example. The sting of rejection after failing to attract a
marriage partner that matches one’s aspiration would be another. Discontentment
in this model can be interpreted as a change in mood upon the event of having not
reached one’s goal that sours all other consumption experiences by a ﬁxed amount.
The resulting utility speciﬁcation is:
U(X,max{t − X,0})=X − β1(X<t ), (16)
where β>0 is the model’s only preference parameter, which measures the extent
to which the decision maker places weight on the possibility of falling below the
contentment threshold when weighing diﬀerent choices of δ and μ and the associated
distributions of U. Note that this utility speciﬁcation is a special case of the general
speciﬁcation above (9).
Substituting μ = M−pδ from the budget constraint (15) simpliﬁes the constrained
optimization problem in two choice variables to an unconstrained optimization prob-
lem in δ, with the following objective function:
v(δ)=M − pδ − βF(t0 − δ). (17)
Under the expectations operator, X is mapped into μ, which is then substituted as
a function of δ, and the indicator function that depends on X is mapped into its
expectation: E[1(X<t )] = F(t)=F(t0 − δ).
The objective function v(δ) explicitly shows the trade-oﬀ that is central to the
model. Self control as measured by the decision maker’s choice of δ provides the
beneﬁt of reduced risk of discontentment (i.e., reducing t from its initial value of t0
to the more moderate or restrained goal, t0 − δ), but comes at the cost of a reduced
level of expected ordinary consumption (i.e., reducing its expected value from μ from
14M to M −pδ). When zero eﬀort is allocated to self control (δ = 0) and 100 percent is
allocated to acquisitiveness, the objective function simpliﬁes to v(0) = M − βF(t0).
The only way that self control can provide improvements in utility is by reducing
the β-weighted risk of discontentment more than the reallocation of eﬀort into self
control costs.
It would be a mistake to compute the ﬁrst-order condition for an interior maximizer
based on diﬀerentiation of (17) with respect to δ using the notation given there
because of a subtle dependence of F(x)o nδ.A sδ changes, so too does the distribution
function F(x), even holding the argument x constant. The indirect dependence of
F on μ not explicit in the notation in (17) stems from the fact that δ aﬀects μ
through the budget constraint (μ = M −pδ). In the objective function (17) in which
the explicit argument of F also depends on δ, two additional terms are needed to
















By specifying F(x) such that μ is strictly a position parameter that shifts the distri-
bution function to the right or left (e.g., if X is normally distributed), the dependence
of F on μ can be expressed directly in the argument of F.
We now assume that X is normally distributed with exogenously given Var(X)=
σ2, which allows the cdf to be rewritten in terms of the standard normal cdf Φ(z),
and pdf φ(z), both of which are independent of μ and σ:
F(t)=F(t0 − δ)=Φ (
t0 − δ − μ
σ
)=Φ (
t0 − (1 − p)δ − M
σ
), (19)
where the last equality follows from substitution of M − pδ for μ from the budget
constraint. After substituting away all channels of dependence on μ so that the
objective function is solely a function of δ, v(δ) can be rewritten as:
v(δ)=M − pδ − βΦ(
t0 − (1 − p)δ − M
σ
). (20)
15For simplicity,the exogenous parameters can be stackedinthe vectorθ ≡ [p,t0,M,β,σ]
and the global maximizer of (20) is denoted δ∗,o rδ∗(θ) to make its dependence on
the exogenous parameters explicit. It turns out that corner solutions to the prob-
lem of maximizing v(δ) with respect to δ occur frequently, and expressions will
be presented below stating where zero self control, δ∗ =0 ,a n dm a x i m u ms e l f
control, δ∗ =( M − μ0)/p, are global maximizers. For an interior maximizer δ∗,
0 <δ ∗ < (M − μ0)/p, the ﬁrst-order condition for a maximizer of (20) is:
−p + βφ(






The second-order condition for an interior maximizer is:
−βφ
 (






2 < 0, (22)
which requires the pdf of X to be strictly increasing at t0 − δ∗ or, equivalently, that
the argument of φ(·) is negative:
t0 − (1 − p)δ
∗ − M<0. (23)





The range of y values that this function hits is the half-open, half-closed real line seg-
ment (0, 1
(2π)1/2]. The inverse relation can be expressed as z = ±[−2log((2π)1/2y)]1/2.
By virtue of the second-order condition, however, only the negative term above is






t0 − (1 − p)δ∗ − M
σ
). (24)
This representation of the ﬁrst-order condition can be interpreted as choosing self
control in a manner that equates the risk-beneﬁt-weighted price of self control (the
left-hand side) with its marginal beneﬁt in terms of reduction in the probability of
discontentment (on the right-hand side).
16The inverse of φ is, in general, not a function but a set-valued relation. However,
the inverse φ−1(·) can be functionally identiﬁed with the negative element from among









t0 − (1 − p)δ∗ − M
σ
. (25)
In applying the inverse of φ(·), it is crucial that the exogenous parameters lie in






(2π)1/2.I f p = 0, then self control is free and
everyone can avoid discontentment with probability one by choosing δ = ∞.I f






β, then self control is too expensive relative to the β-weighted concern over the
possibility of discontentment, and δ = 0 is the expected utility maximizing choice.






which implies, too, that p<1 must hold. Otherwise, if p ≥ 1, it would cost more
than one unit of expected ordinary consumption to reduce the contentment threshold
by one unit, which would be harmful on net to the decision maker: if μ falls by a
magnitude greater than δ, then the probability of discontentment goes up, not down.












provided all conditions on the exogenous parameters are met that guarantee a strictly
interior maximizer.
Demand for self control as given by δ∗(θ) turns out to be non-monotonic in p,a n d
discontinuous in p on some subsets of the border regions of the admissible parameter
set where the right-hand side of (27) is exactly zero or at its maximum (M − μ0)/p.
17As illustrated in subsequent sections, small changes in price can cause erratic jumps
in demand for self control, from zero to strictly positive levels, without continuously
increasing as a function of p. The non-monotonic and sometimes highly unstable
statics of self control with respect to exogenous variables θ are analyzed next and
depicted with graphical analyses.
3 Consumer Response to Changes in the Decision Making
Environment: Statics of δ∗(θ)
As new consumer ﬁnance regulations, programs and products are rolled out, a basic
question is how consumers will respond to incentives used to encourage uptake of
those new oﬀerings. An incentive to take up such oﬀerings would, in our model,
amount to a reduction in p. T h u s ,t h er e s p o n s eo fδ∗ to p is perhaps the most
important relationship to characterize. Before presenting graphs showing δ∗ as a
function of p, standard calculus-based expressions are stated to reveal both their
insights and limitations. One issue with δ∗(θ) as a function of p is discontinuity.
In some regions of parameter space, δ∗(θ) does not respond at all to changes in
p. In other regions, however, very small changes in p cause optimal self control to
discontinuously alternate between corner and interior quantities of self control, at
which points
∂δ∗(θ)
∂p does not exist. The question of where in the parameter space
corner solutions prevail and what happens along the boundary between interior and
corner values of δ∗ are primary points of interest. The results reported in this section
apply only to parameter values of θ at which δ∗(θ)i si n t e r i o r .
According to formula (27), an exogenous increase in a person’s (individual, commu-
nity, culture, or country’s) contentment threshold t0, while holding material resources







When t0 rises without any increase in resources available to ﬁnance consumption,
then the decision maker faces increased risk of discontentment. The decision maker
responds by re-allocating eﬀort away from ordinary consumption and into self control.
One scenario that matches this prediction would be a comparison of religiosity in a
number of poor countries between, say, 1980 and 2000. Increasing information (e.g.,
via internet) about consumption levels in rich countries whose national incomes were
growing would exert upward pressure on t0 even in countries not enjoying growth.
The model implies that a rational response to such a scenario may not involve re-
doubling eﬀorts to catch up in terms of growth opportunities but rather re-allocate
eﬀort away from ordinary consumption and toward self control instead. Many reli-
gions provide, among many other services, technology for ﬁnding fulﬁllment without
increasing consumption. If one thinks about the feudal economies under which orga-
nized Christianity developed, or the much earlier economies of Asia in which Buddhist
philosophy ﬂourished, the model would predict that these expansions of practices that
teach moderation of desire would coincide with increasingly available signals avail-
able to poor people about the high levels of ordinary consumption enjoyed by others
(interpreted as an upward shift of t0).
The eﬀect of greater wealth (e.g., advances in labor-saving technology that increase
the value of one’s endowment of eﬀort) exerts an unambiguously negative eﬀect on







Therefore, in this model, self control is unambiguously an inferior good. This inferior
good result hints at the negative income eﬀects we will see below that are strong
19enough to produce upward-sloping demand curves.
Interestingly, if the contentment threshold and the real value of one’s endowment
of resources grow by equal amounts, the two eﬀects cancel each other. Changes in
contentment thresholds (i.e., aspirations or goals needed to achieve contentment) and
changes in wealth only have eﬀects on self control net of changes in the other. Shifts
in the contentment threshold t0 have an eﬀect on self control when t0 changes by more
than M. And shifts in M are similarly important only if they do not track changes
in t0.
It isuseful to denote the bracketedterm in(27) as the functionh(y) ≡ [−2log((2π)1/2y)]1/2




β), mapping standard normal pdf values (y)i n t oz on
the positive real line. One notices that h(y) is a positive valued and strictly decreas-
ing function. Taking advantage of the inequality h (y) < 0, it is straightforward to
verify the intuitively obvious result that an increase in β, reﬂecting stronger subjec-
















2 > 0. (30)
The parameter σ represents the volatility or riskiness of ordinary consumption.
Another interpretation of σ is as a proxy for wealth inequality orthogonal to eﬀort,
since the distribution of material standards of living will be more spread out in en-
vironments with large σ, even if everyone were to choose the same level of eﬀort. To
characterize the sign of
∂δ∗(θ)
∂σ ,i ti su s e f u lt on o t i c et h a th (y)=− 1
yh(y) and apply this












































β) is greater or less than 1. By deﬁnition,
h(φ(z)) = z for positive z. Therefore, the sign of
∂δ∗(θ)





20greater or less than φ(1) ≈ 0.2420. Keeping in mind that h is decreasing and therefore
that h(y) < 1i fy>φ (1) and h(y) > 1i fy<φ (1), the direction of the desired eﬀect


















Thus, the eﬀect of σ on δ∗(θ) is in general non-monotonic. For moderate levels of σ
and p, the eﬀect is positive, indicating increased demand for self control when risk or
inequalityrises. The intuition for this is that, in low-risk low-inequalityenvironments,
a small increase in risk or inequality increases the probability of discontentment on a
relatively steep range of the pdf φ, implying that increases in δ have proportionally
large eﬀects. In contrast, when beginning on a relatively ﬂat range of the pdf farther
than one standard deviation from the mean, adjustments to δ have a much weaker
eﬀect in terms of reducing the risk of discontentment.
Finally, the eﬀect of p on δ∗(θ) is, once again, non-monotonic, as the ﬁgures in the






















This can be developed, once again, using h (y)=
1
yh(y). It is unclear, however, whether
this leads to any new insights about regions of parameter space in which demand for
self control is upward- versus downward-sloping.
4D e m a n d f o r S e l f C o n t r o l
Figure 1 presents nine demand curves for self control, plotting δ∗ as a function of
price for particular values of the other parameters. The x-axis is δ∗, the distance by
which the individual chooses to shift the contentment threshold t downward from its
default t0. The y-axis is the full range of prices from zero to the upper bound given in
21(26). The resource endowment M is normalized to 1 for all graphs. In Figure 1, t0 is
normalized to 1. In later ﬁgures, t0 is varied up and down by two standard deviations.
Figure 1 varies σ moving from top to bottom and β moving left to right. Moving
down Figure 1 from top to bottom, the random component of ordinary consumption
X is increasing as indicated by the values of σ =0 .1, 1.0 and 10.0. The x-axes are
re-scaled in the three rows to better see the detail of the curves. Moving left to right,
values of β are 0.5, 1, and 2, reﬂecting increasing subjective weight on the risk of
discontentment.
Non-monotonicity of δ∗(θ) as a function of p is evident in the upward-sloping (i.e.,
backward bending) regions of the upper center and upper right subﬁgures of Figure 1.
The upper right demand curve in Figure 1 also shows extreme sensitivity of demand
for self control to price near p =0 .9. In this range, quantity demanded can shift
from 0 to the maximum amount possible in response to very small changes in price,
suggestive of cultural or religious revolutions whose philosophies depend heavily on
critiques of excessive focus on ordinary consumption and advocating the practice of
strict self control. We leave it to future research to pursue the question of whether
these large price eﬀects in opposite directions along the same demand curve (as in the
upper right subﬁgure of Figure 1) might provide an explanation for the emergence of
religious and spiritual movements observed in the historical record. Their cautionary
implication for programs and new product launches aiming to improve self control
should be clear from the diﬃcult-to-predict responses to price incentives in Figure 1.
Unstable price eﬀects on demand for self control are further elaborated upon below.
The response of consumption risk on self control,
∂δ∗(θ)
∂σ , can also be seen to be
non-monotonic in Figure 1, by reading oﬀ the quantity demanded corresponding to
ap r i c eo f0 .02 on the three subﬁgures along the left. In the topmost left subﬁgure
corresponding to σ =0 .1a n dβ =0 .5, a price of 0.02 would correspond to a value of
22δ∗ of slightly more than 0.3. Moving down to the center left subﬁgure corresponding
to σ =1a n dβ =0 .5, ap r i c eo f0 .02 would correspond to a value of δ∗ more than
2, slightly less than 3. In the bottom left subﬁgure corresponding to σ =1 0a n d
β =0 .5, however, a price of 0.02 would correspond to a value of δ∗ of exactly 0.
These three point evaluations for successively increasing values of σ show that, for
the parameter values considered, δ∗(θ) is an increasing function of σ when evaluated
at σ =0 .1 but decreasing when evaluated at σ = 1. This non-monotonicity is not an
artifact of scaling.
Moving from left to right in Figure 1, the weight on discontentment in the objective
function is increasing, and demand for self control consequently shifts out to the
right just as one would expect. The combination of low σ and large β produces
demand curves with an upward-sloping portion mentioned above, reﬂecting large
income eﬀects on the demand for self control.
Figure 2 illustrates an analogous set of demand curves, this time with a default
contentment threshold that is very easy to reach: t0 = M − 2σ. This corresponds
to an environment in which more than 95 percent of people will achieve content-
ment, even when allocating zero eﬀort to self control (so that t = t0). In this case,
the possibility of discontentment is remote. Positive quantities of self control are
nevertheless demanded, which reduces the chance of discontentment even more. No
unusual features are seen when t0 is already very easy to reach, with self control
increasing monotonically as its price declines.
Figure 3 illustrates another analogous set of environments, this time with a default
contentment threshold that is very diﬃcult to reach: t0 = M +2 σ.I n t h i s c a s e , i f
zero self control were demanded, then risk of discontentment is more than 95 percent.
Figure 3 shows that environments with low σ and high t0, in which discontentment is
virtually certain, produce demand curves with large upward-sloping regions. These
23strongly negative income eﬀects are intuitive, because the high degree of certainty of
discontentment on the convex portion of the pdf produces something tantamount to
increasing returns to self control. The more self control is applied, the more productive
self control becomes at reducing the probability of discontentment.
Figure 4 presents expenditure-price curves to visualize what fraction of total in-
come is allocated to self control over the price range. Recalling that the budget
constraint μ+pδ = M with M normalized to 1, the quantity 100pδ gives the percent-
age of the wealth endowment (net of exogenously given μ0) allocated to self control.
Figure 4 presents nine expenditure-price curves with the same parameter values as in
Figure 1. These show that non-monotonic expenditures on self control—increasing
and then decreasing expenditures on self control as prices increases from zero—is the
rule rather than the exception. When price is very low, a large quantity of self control
can be purchased for a small expenditure, moving the contentment threshold to the
concave portion of the pdf of X. When price is very large, the sacriﬁce in terms of μ is
so great that only a small portion of the endowment is allocated to self control. In the
middle of the price range, however, a larger and larger share of wealth is allocated to
self control reﬂecting movement along the convex (increasing-returns) portion of the
pdf until the concave portion is reached, at which point total expenditures decline.
Finally, we document price discontinuities in the demand for self control that occur
for some parameterizations. Discontinuity occurs when quantities demanded jump
from zero to a substantial share of wealth, in response to a small movement in price.
Such a discontinuity is illustrated in the three snapshots of the consumer’s objective
function depicted in the three subﬁgures of Figure 5. Figure 5 shows the univariate
objective function v(δ) from equation (20) at three nearby values, p =0 .70, 0.72, and
0.74. The values of all other parameters are as in Figure 1, except for t0 =0 .5 to reﬂect
a scenario in which discontentment is deﬁned by all levels of ordinary consumption
24more than half a standard deviation below the default mean of X, μ0. This ensures
that both competing motives—applying eﬀort, on the one hand, to increase the mean
of X and, on the other, to decrease the threshold at which discontentment is deﬁned—
are distinctly reﬂected in the objective function. The three curves representing v(δ)
shift smoothly as price increases from 0.70 to 0.74. In the ﬁrst and second subﬁgures
of Figure 5, the maximizer δ∗ is in both cases interior. However, moving from the
second to third subﬁgure, the global maximizer of v(δ) jumps discontinuously, with
an abrupt shift to the left-most corner, δ∗ = 0, seen in the third subﬁgure.
5 Summary and Discussion
When the cost of self control is suﬃciently large, demand for self control is zero and
the consumer chooses a path to happiness exclusively through the channel of ordinary
consumption. When the price of self control falls below this critical threshold (which
is a function of nearly all the exogenously given parameters in the environment), de-
mand for self control responds systematically, although not always monotonically, to
shifts in the parameters that describe the decision maker’s environment. There are
three globally monotonic eﬀects on the demand for self control to report. First, self
control is an inferior good, always decreasing in response to growing wealth, holding
all other parameters, especially the decision maker’s goals and aspirations, constant.
More intense desire for ordinary consumption (i.e., raising the discontentment thresh-
old t0) increases demand for self control, as does the preference parameter β measuring
the weight placed on the risk of falling short of one’s contentment threshold. Self con-
trol is a monotonically decreasing function of price in highly uncertain environments
but backward bending (with an upward sloping portion) when discontentment risk
is large and nearly certain. The eﬀect of uncertainty on demand for self control is,
25holding price of self control constant, non-monotonic, reﬂecting increasing and de-
creasing returns to self control that are a direct consequence of convex versus concave
portions of the pdf of the discontentment risk function. This non-monotonicity would
disappear given a triangle-shaped pdf without convex and concave segments in the
domain.
Whether incentives to induce consumers to engage in more self control will be
eﬀective or not depends on where in the model’s parameter space the decision making
environment is. If the price of self control is way above the critical threshold where
δ∗(θ) cuts oﬀ to zero, then small inducements are predicted to have no eﬀect. In other
environments,
∂δ∗(θ)
∂p may be large or small, and of varying sign.
If the decision making environment happens to be on an upward sloping portion
of the demand for self control curve, then regulation, programs and products oﬀered
with incentives that reduce the price of self control can have the unanticipated eﬀect
of decreasing demand for self control. For example, suppose we observe IRA retire-
ment account limits raised by an act of the US Congress, which is interpreted as a
reduction in p, and simultaneously observe Americans’ savings rate to fall. In such
an environment, high priced self control technologies induce greater uptake of self
control than low priced oﬀerings.11
The case most conducive for policy interventions to succeed at encouraging self
control are the nearly ﬂat but decreasing portions of the demand for self control
curves. Figures 1, 3, 4 and 5 show a number of environments in which, starting from
a parameter value θ at which δ∗(θ) = 0, a small reduction in p induces large shifts into
self control. The discontinuous shift from zero to large expenditures on self control is
seen moving from the right-most to the center subﬁgures of Figure 5.
11The widely followed Indian teacher of breathing exercises and philosophy, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar (who founded the
Art of Living Foundation), says that it is important to charge a positive price for the services he oﬀers, even though
he is willing to give them away for free, because consumers value it more when its price is positive (Shankar, 2010).
26The model features the possibility of rationally choosing to abandon self control,
which challenges a basic deﬁnition of bounded rationality often put forward in the
behavioral economics literature based on three bounds: on willpower, computational
capacity, and self-interest. The model describes an outcome in which agents (and
the cultures they populate) explicitly choose to abandon self control if the beneﬁts of
self control do not outweigh its costs. This abandonment of self control is a rational
and predictable function of opportunities and costs in the environment. If one views
diﬀerent cultures’ philosophical traditions through the lens of this model, one predic-
tion (for appropriate values of θ) is that some cultures devote themselves wholly to
ordinary consumption while others emphasize allocating eﬀort to self control in a way
that moderates desire for ordinary consumption. The mix of wealth, aspirations and
a beneﬁcial uncertainty that enables some to experience the good fortune of climbing
upwards in the consumption distribution plays a crucial role creating the condition
under which individuals or cultures might move from the corner solution of zero to
positive levels of self control.
Although the model is behavioral in that it presumes willpower is costly and that
preferences can be changed, the price theory analysis is neoclassical. We use a par-
simonious and highly stylized neoclassical approach to the behavioral problem of
choosing how much self control to acquire when making consumption decisions. The
model is essentially the two-good, one-period consumer choice problem from under-
graduate microeconomic textbooks, augmented with a term in the utility function
that depends on the diﬀerence between the level of ordinary consumption chosen and
a reference-point level of ordinary consumption needed to hit one’s psychological tar-
get or, equivalently, avoid discontentment. Although it draws inspiration from the
satisﬁcing and goal setting literatures, the model is not a satisﬁcing model because
it wholly adopts the assumption of expected utility maximization and its implica-
27tion of exhaustive search through the choice set rather than limited search as in the
satisﬁcing model.
The instability of demand for self control in even this simplest of models should
perhaps give policy makers pause when predicting rates of uptake for new programs,
conformity with new regulations, or forecasting demand for new ﬁnancial services
aimed at increasing self control. The concerns raised by this model do not touch on
the diﬃcult philosophical problems of paternalism or result from ambiguity about the
meaning of “excessive” consumption. The model assumes that, after introspectively
consulting our own experiences and temptations, it is possible for consumption to
be excessive. Taking that process of reﬂection by the consumer on his or her own
goals and means of avoiding discontentment, the model describes how consumers sys-
tematically use self control technology in their real world environments to reallocate
resources away from ordinary consumption to other activities that raise utility by
reducing risk of discontentment.12
The point we want to make is that technologies aimed at aiding consumer self
control, because of the strong income eﬀects they produce, can lead to counterintu-
itive eﬀects of interventions intended to encourage demand for self control. Without
conclusive evidence to the contrary, self control should perhaps be assumed to be
non-monotonic in price and therefore highly unstable. The possibility of upward-
sloping demand schedules for self control raises the specter of policy interventions
with grossly unanticipated or otherwise disappointing eﬀects.
This theoretical ﬁnding is consistent with empirical accounts of interventionsaimed
12This rationalization of partial or total lack of self control draws inspiration from the work of Caplan (2001),
whose model predicts that irrationality rationally accumulates where it is least costly while responding systematically
to incentives in the environment. The rational irrationality framework is expanded by Beaulier and Caplan (2007).
Issues raised here regarding normative behavioral economics were ﬁrst raised by Berg (2003) and elaborated in the
context of behavioral economics and paternalism in a model of social welfare maximization for a society of satisﬁcers
(Berg and Gigerenzer, 2007).
28at improving self control that wound up resulting in shifts in the opposite direction
as was anticipated. Pence (2001) documents how interventions to induce households
to save more have elicited essentially zero response, consistent with a decision making
environment in which comparative statics are uniformly zero. The paper by do Valle,
Pieters, and Zeelenberg (2008) demonstrates counterintuitive self control eﬀects that
can be interpreted as resulting from an upward sloping portion of the demand for self
control curve. Many have expressed more general skepticism about the wisdom of
consumer protections founded on the premise that consumer behavior ispathologically
biased. In some ﬁnancial market models (e.g., Berg and Lien, 2005; Jerzmanowski and
Nabar, 2008), biased beliefs or behavior leads to positive welfare eﬀects, raising the
possibility that loss of self control in some contexts can have positive externalities. In
such environments, interventions aiming to de-bias individual behavior might reduce
eﬃciency and, with it, social welfare.
The model introduced here also underscores that time inconsistency and the multiple-
selves framework are not necessary for modeling self control. No time dimension is
needed whatsoever. We view this static model of demand for self control as comple-
mentary to the insightful work on dynamical models of self control, especially Gif-
ford’s (2008) emotions-based approach and the work on adaptive aspirations by G¨ uth
(2010). We conclude that, for purposes of predicting consumer demand for products
and services that aid self control, one would like to have a much richer empirical
record, with numerous experiments in diﬀerent locations and with diﬀerent popula-
tions so that diﬀerent values of the other parameters in the model might be controlled
for. Without that data, one default position consistent with this model would prefer
very simple regulatory rules that fall on corporations over those that impinge directly
on the choice sets of consumers, which would likely produce more predictable results
on the supply side by avoiding the unpredictability of non-monotonic demand for self
29control.
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Figure 1: Demand for Self Control
The demand curves above plot expected utility maximizing values of d over prices ranging 
from zero to the upper bound in (26), with t_0 = 1 and M = 1.
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Figure 2: Demand for Self Control with Easy-to-Reach Contentment Threshold Default (t_0 = 
M - 2s)
 b = 0.5  b = 1

























































0 10 20 30
0
0.005
0.01 b = 2
low inequality
 s = 0.1
 s = 1
high inequality
 s = 10
Figure 3: Ordinary Demand for Control with Hard-to-Reach Contentment Threshold Default 
(t_0 = M + 2s)
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Figure 4: Percentage of M Expended on Self Control as a Function of Price






























































)Figure 5: Discontinuity of d*: Large Change in Global 
Maximizer Following Small Change in Price
p = 0.70, optimal self control d* = 56%
p = 0.72, optimal self control d* = 49%
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